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Monetary history reveals the fact that folly has frequently been paramount; for it 
describes many fateful mistakes. On the other hand, it would be too much to say that 
mankind has learned nothing from these mistakes. 
    Knut Wicksell (1935, p.4), as cited by Meltzer (2003, p. 725). 
 
For monetary policymakers, and for business economists, a major challenge is tracking, 
understanding, and recognizing changes in the economy as they occur. Economists are fond of modeling 
economies as mathematical systems but some policymakers—former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, 
perhaps most notably—emphasized that model uncertainty causes monetary policy to be an exercise in 
risk management.  In this framework, policymakers seek to learn about the changing economy even while 
they adopt policies that hedge against large unfortunate outcomes not well captured by the forecasting 
models. 1 To a large extent, the Greenspan paradigm was an exercise in policymaking under both risk and 
Knightian uncertainty. In a world characterized by Knightian uncertainty, the probability distribution of 
outcomes following economic shocks are not readily known to the policymaker ex ante. By contrast, 
under conventional measures of risk, policymakers have some ex ante knowledge of the distribution of 
outcomes. In Greenspan’s view, therefore, policymakers are rarely sure of which probability distribution 
they are confronting. Thus, the prudent course of action is an application of Bayesian decision making: (i) 
gather as much information as possible; (ii) quantify the probability of possible outcomes; and, (iii)  act 
aggressively to hedge against potentially catastrophic outcomes (deflation or depression).  
During the so-called “New Economy Era,” labor productivity (output per hour) played a key role in 
shaping the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) response to evolving economic conditions. 
Indeed, productivity discussions have a long history at FOMC meetings. For instance, unexpectedly 
strong productivity growth during the early 1980s generated arguments that would become familiar to 
participants more than a decade later. Questions such as:  How much should the Committee risk its price 
stability goal to gamble that nascent accelerations in productivity will persist? If the Committee were to 
regard the risk as unacceptable and tighten policy preemptively—as suggested by inflation forecast 
targeting with models that do not incorporate the positive shock to productivity growth—how much 
                                                      
1 See Greenspan (2004). Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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output is lost? And, how does this interact with the FOMC’s dual mandate from the Congress to seek both 
price stability and maximum sustainable economic growth?  Policymakers and their staffs do use models, 
of course, explicit and implicit, and such models may be false in ways that impair their usefulness.  
In this article, we thus examine how monetary policymakers recognized and responded to the 
productivity acceleration of the 1990s. We focus specifically on why, initially, they regarded the 
acceleration as positive (a rightward shift in the textbook “aggregate supply” curve), but later came to 
regard the sustained acceleration as a threat to inflation stability (a rightward shift in the “aggregate 
demand” curve). We seek clues that illuminate how members of the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) struggled to balance huge information flows that were sometimes contradictory with their 
forecasts and their ex-ante views of the monetary transmission mechanism over the medium term. By 
drawing from Verbatim FOMC meeting transcripts, we will show how Greenspan nearly single-handedly 
convinced the FOMC that the economy was changing in ways that the data and the models could not 
conceive of in real time.2  We do not ask whether the Committee’s decisions were consistent with any 
specific macroeconomic model. Instead, we focus on the evolution of the dynamic process consisting of 
interaction among the economy, the Committee’s members, and the FOMC’s staff.3 At times, we include 
rather long quotations from the transcripts.  In our opinion, these are valuable to understanding the issues, 
and do not indicate a lazy unwillingness on the part of the authors to summarize the argument.4  Verbatim 
                                                      
2 To track the evolution of FOMC thinking regarding changes in trend, or structural, productivity, we quote 
extensively from publicly available transcripts of FOMC meetings. In some cases, we have lightly edited the 
transcript to reduce length and enhance readability. The original transcripts are available on the Federal Reserve 
Board’s web site.  Comparisons between our quotes and those transcripts are easily made via simple text searches. 
3 Although we refer to the “FOMC staff,” these are the staff of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. All FOMC 
briefing materials available to the public are materials produced by the Federal Reserve Board staff, in two parts. 
These are commonly are referred to by the cover of their covers as the “Greenbook” and “Bluebook.” Additional, ad 
hoc materials also may be distributed. These materials become public five years after the respective FOMC meetings 
after redaction of certain material. In addition, materials are prepared for Reserve Bank presidents by their staffs. So 
far as we are aware, these materials are not circulated to other FOMC members nor are archived to be made 
available to the public. Romer and Romer (2008) compare the accuracy of forecasts produced by Board staff to 
those of FOMC members, including the Reserve Bank presidents. The latter do not fare well in the comparison. 
4 This paper is an extension of Anderson and Kliesen (2010), which examines the evolution of FOMC thinking 
regarding changes in trend, or structural, productivity from the 1980s to 2007. They also quote extensively from 
publicly available transcripts of FOMC meetings. Federal Reserve staff input to the FOMC consists of two parts. 
First, the Board of Governors staff prepares material in advance of each meeting. These materials often are referred 
to by the color of their covers as the “Greenbook” and “Bluebook.” Beginning in 2010, the Greenbook was expanded Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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meeting transcripts are released by no other central bank in the world, and furnish a unique opportunity to 
understand the dynamics of monetary policymaking. 
 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE DATA 
During the last decade or so, a consensus has arisen among economists that trend growth rates for 
potential real output and labor productivity increased around 1995.  Figure 1 shows that that the 
acceleration in productivity, as measured over different horizons, appeared to occur in the mid-1990s.  
Because the 1990s acceleration of labor productivity was unforeseen and challenged extant views, its 
recognition was delayed.  Typical is the 1996 Economic Report of the President, prepared during 1995.  
In the report, the Council of Economic Advisers projected that labor productivity in the private nonfarm 
business sector would increase at an average annual rate of 1.2 percent from the third quarter of 1995 to 
the end of 2002.  This estimate extrapolated recent experience: from 1973 to 1995 productivity had grown 
at an average annual rate of 1.4 percent.  Initial productivity measurements published during 1995 and 
1996 were consistent with the Council’s forecast, and did not signal an increase in productivity growth   
[Insert Figure 1] 
The incoming data during 1995 and 1996 clashed with widespread anecdotal firm-level evidence that 
spending on information and communication technology equipment was increasing productivity.  To 
some analysts, the productivity acceleration was no more than a cyclical response to more robust 
economic activity.  But, at the same time, large investments in information and communication 
technology (ICT) equipment could not be ignored.5  Analysts quickly identified decreases in semi-
conductor prices, and the prices of business equipment built with them, as the primary cause of the 
productivity acceleration.  But, prices also had fallen in the past—would rapid price decreases be 
                                                                                                                                                                           
to include more analysis of financial market conditions, and renamed the “Tealbook.” Additional, ad hoc materials 
also may be prepared and distributed. Federal Reserve Bank staff also prepare materials for each Bank president. 
Forecasts and most other briefing materials prepared by the Board staff become public five years after the respective 
FOMC meeting, although some portions are redacted from public documents. Materials prepared by Federal 
Reserve Bank staff are not made public. 
5 Such changes are not confined to the United States.  See Pilat and Lee (2001) and Colecchia and Schreyer (2002) 
for a survey the OECD countries. Armstrong et al. (2002) examine the Canadian experience. Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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sustained?  Further, some analysts asked if the increased investment in ICT was largely a change in the 
type of producers’ durable equipment being purchased, rather than a genuine capital deepening.  A typical 
after-the-fact assessment is Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2002):   “… the story begins with an increase in 
total factor productivity growth in the IT-producing sectors (computer hardware, software, and 
telecommunications), which led to falling relative prices and induced capital deepening in IT equipment.” 
By 2001, the Council of Economic Advisors had increased its projection of the annual growth of 
structural labor productivity to 2.3 percent per year.  Indeed, the 2001 recession dispelled doubt regarding 
the staying power of the productivity acceleration.  During the recession, productivity growth defied 
historical experience by increasing rather than decreasing.6  Other forecasters, including many included in 
Blue Chip Economic Indicators and the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF), were even more optimistic.7  As seen in Figure 2, private-sector forecasters surveyed 
for the SPF since 1992 did not increase their estimate of structural productivity growth until 2000, when 
they raised their estimate from 1.5 percent to around 2.5 percent.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
LEARNING, THE CANONICAL MODEL, AND THE GREENSPAN MODEL  
Learning is an essential part of modern macroeconomics and essential to our narrative. The literature 
regarding learning in macroeconomic models is large and growing.  In one significant contribution, 
Thomas Sargent (2008) notes the distinction between outside learning in which an observer seeks to gain 
understanding of the economy’s workings, and inside learning where the actions of the learners 
themselves alter the path of the economy.  Almost every history of the Federal Reserve System can be 
interpreted as containing some element of learning by policymakers.  Allan Meltzer’s (2003) 
                                                      
6 See the discussion in Edge, Laubach and Williams (2004). Interested readers also should compare Gordon (2000) 
and Gordon (2003).  In his earlier writings, Gordon argued that productivity had not accelerated in nearly 90 percent 
of the economy and that trend growth of total factor productivity had actually decelerated.  The passage of time, and 
revisions to the data, have confirmed the shift in trend.  The evidence for potential GDP remains mixed, however; 
see for example Kouparitsas (2005). 
7 See the Sept. 10, 2000, Blue Chip Economic Indicators or the First Quarter 2001 Survey of Professional 
Forecasters. Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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extraordinary history of the Federal Reserve, in part, is a history of learning how to conduct monetary 
policy.8  In a similar vein, portions of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s monumental monetary 
history of the United States explore the evolution of monetary policymaking thinking at the Federal 
Reserve after 1913; see especially section 3 of chapter 6 (pp. 249-270) and the discussion of 
policymaking during the Great Contraction in chapters 7 and 8.   
The closest antecedent to our work is Romer and Romer (2002), which explores the FOMC’s (and 
the Council of Economic Advisers’) learning of stabilization tradeoffs beginning in the 1950s.  They 
conclude that policymakers during the 1950s knew and “forgot” a good model, learned an inferior model 
to be used during the 1960s and 1970s, and later (during the 1980s) rediscovered the “good” model—
what, in his commentary, Sargent (2002) labels the “Berkeley story.”  Economists acknowledge that all 
economic models are literally ‘false’; no model can be rich enough to be an exact representation of the 
economy. Some aspects of falsity are accepted as approximations—by definition, a model necessarily 
omits certain aspects of the economy for tractability.  Selected judiciously, such omissions need not 
impair the usefulness of the model for policy analysis or forecasting. Models also may be false in ways 
that do impair their usefulness, including errors in equation specification and/or parameter values.   
The canonical textbook model, which underpins the staff’s FRB-US model, teaches that increases in 
labor productivity lead to increases in economic growth (real per capita GDP). In this model, 
accelerations of labor productivity are viewed as a positive supply shock, which reduce unit costs and 
accordingly boost real incomes and profits. Increases in labor productivity growth similar to that which 
                                                      
8 The source documents for Meltzer’s book are hosted on the Internet by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis as 
part of its FRASER project at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/meltzer/. In this study, we distinguish studies that examine 
policymakers’ learning processes from studies that argue that the pursuit of alternative policies during specified time 
periods would have produced superior economic outcomes. We also would omit from the category of policymakers’ 
learning any circumstance where policy changed due to political pressure rather than learning.  Indeed, some such 
episodes perhaps are best regarded as policymakers suppressing their understanding of the correct monetary policy 
in order to appease political pressures.  Bremner (2004) relates in chapters 9 and 11, respectively, how Presidents 
Johnson and Nixon successfully pushed Federal Reserve Chairman Martin to compromise his anti-inflationary 
views. Abrams (2006) demonstrates, via quotations from the Nixon Oval Office tapes, how strong, direct, and 
persistent pressure was used to induce Arthur Burns to adopt policies wholly contrary to writings in Burn’s own 
1957 book.  Subsequent re-discovery by policymakers of their earlier, more defensible principles is not an example 
of policymaker learning.  Policy learning always includes significant differences of opinion; Meltzer’s chapter 8, for 
example, concisely compares and contrasts such differences prior to 1951.  Previous articles written within the 
Federal Reserve include Kozicki (1997) and Tallman (2003). Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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occurred in the United States during the 1990s has occurred in other eras and in other countries, and these 
developments are usually associated with technological innovations to produce rising living standards.9  
In most instances, analysts (and policymakers) found it difficult to recognize the occurrence of a 
“structural break” due to lags in the timeliness of incoming data and to subsequent data revisions.10 If 
there is a common thread running through the FOMC’s changing model of how productivity affects the 
economy, it is consumer and business sentiment. What is lacking in the FOMC transcripts, however, is a 
“model” of such sentiment. Absent such a model, the Committee appeared to be basing its changing 
views on an unobserved (and unobservable) variable.  
This unobserved variable, the so-called Greenspan model, was termed a black box by Blinder and 
Reis (2005), but nonetheless sufficient for policymaking. In their view, “economists should not delude 
ourselves into believing that we know enough to use precisely specified models to design quantitative 
policy rules to which a real central bank would want to commit for a lengthy period of time. In the world 
of practical policymaking, robustness is probably more important than a model-specific optimality that 
may be spurious” (p. 17). It is thus difficult to reject the hypothesis that the Greenspan Committee’s 
responses to fluctuations in productivity growth were anything other than ad hoc attempts at “risk 
management.”  The FOMC transcripts from 1996 and 1997 suggest that Chairman Greenspan placed little 
confidence in aggregate real GDP as an indicator of the direction of the economy. Perhaps because 
accurate, timely data are essential for activist monetary policymaking, Greenspan shifted his focus away 
from GDP toward a broad array of individual-industry data. In particular, he focused on productivity 
growth in manufacturing and the broader nonfinancial corporate sector. One danger in such a 
disaggregated approach is that many industries primarily produce intermediate products that do not 
                                                      
9 Basu et. al. (2003) compare and contrast the differing US and UK experiences after 1995. 
10 Orphanides and Van Norden (2002). Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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appear directly in GDP.11  Policymakers risk significant errors if they respond too rapidly to incoming 
data that later revise significantly.12   
The FOMC, by contrast, was initially reticent to fully embrace Chairman Greenspan’s new-economy 
view, and came to see more rapid productivity growth as a threat to inflation stability, in two ways. First, 
corporate profits and business fixed investment were increasing, contributing to stronger aggregate 
demand. In part, such investment reflected the obsolesce of existing (older) equipment and the shorter 
lifetimes of much newer equipment (particularly IT-related equipment). Second, household spending was 
increasing due to wealth effects. Higher corporate earnings, both current and anticipated, boosted equity 
prices. If the wealth elasticity of consumption was large, this caused a second boost to aggregate demand. 
Compounding this problem, faster output growth lowered the unemployment rate, raising the nominal 
wage rate and adding to the upward pressure on inflation. In this framework, the Committee came to see 
the productivity acceleration as increasing demand today while promising increased supply in the future. 
At one level, this presented policymakers with a form of a time inconsistency problem. 13 
In neo-classical growth accounting models used at the Board and elsewhere, labor productivity 
depends on capital deepening (net additions to the capital stock) and MFP.14 Against this backdrop, labor 
productivity entered Committee discussions in two places. First, the growth rate of potential output equals 
the product of labor force growth and labor productivity growth. Second, in the markup pricing model 
with predetermined wage growth so-often used by Committee members, more rapid productivity growth 
promised to reduce upward pressure on prices. For monetary policymakers during the 1990s, as it had 
been since 1982, the ultimate question was choosing an appropriate target level for the federal funds 
                                                      
11 This point is made clearly by Triplett (2002). 
12 In the models of Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2004), optimal response to imperfect observation of output (and 
productivity) depends on the noise in the system.  The optimal response to the optimal estimate of output displays 
certainty equivalence—but what is to be done when different policymakers have different estimates of potential 
output? 
13 Interestingly, Greenspan would argue in mid-2010 that high growth rates of labor productivity were impeding the 
natural upswing in job growth that accompanies an economic recovery. See Greenspan interview on CNBC’s 
“Squawkbox,” July 1, 2010. As we will document in this article, this wasn’t the first instance of Greenspan pointing 
to pernicious effects from rapidly rising labor productivity.  
14 See Anderson and Kliesen (2006). Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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rate.15 This pattern was consistent with Greenspan’s assertion that the Fed was able to be much more 
accommodative to faster output growth than past experience would have suggested.16 
Largely ignored in the Committee’s discussion, however, was the contribution of technical 
progress (as measured by multi-factor, or total, productivity, MFP) to increasing the productivity of 
existing capital. The Committee’s views were reflected in discussions of a higher equilibrium real short-
term interest rate, r-star (or r*). R-star can be thought of as the real short-term interest rate that would be 
required to achieve growth of real GDP and inflation at their targets over a three-year horizon. If higher 
productivity increased the return to capital, then it increased r*, and the Committee was required to 
increase its rate target if no more than to maintain the extant stance of monetary policy.17 This is 
consistent with the pattern seen in Figure 3, which reproduces a chart from the “Bluebook” prepared for 
the June 2004 FOMC meeting that plots the actual real federal funds rate and a range of estimated 
equilibrium real short-term rates. In Figure 3, the estimated range of the equilibrium real federal funds 
rate began to rise above its historical average in 1994, where it remained until the 2001 recession.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
As Sargent noted, policymakers who start with a model that is perhaps flawed or incomplete, can 
settle on an “approximate but good enough” model of the economy. This convergence, which would 
characterize our description of the FOMC during the productivity revolution, thus occurs through learning 
and experience. However, unlike Sargent, we pursue this convergence process by examining the policy 
record (transcripts) rather than comparing macro modeling tools.  The transcripts provide invaluable 
                                                      
15 Wynne (2002) discusses in detail the time-line of federal funds rate targets during the 1990s in response to 
incoming productivity data.  Thornton (2006) discusses the FOMC’s federal funds rate target beginning September 
1982. 
16 One might argue that employing real-time estimates would provide a better sense of the data that actually 
confronted policymakers at the time. Regrettably, we do not have access to that data (if it exists). 
17 R* can be thought of as the short-term real interest rate path that equilibrates actual output with potential output. 
The discussion of a negative r* and its implications would also come to dominate the discussion during the 2007-
2009 recession, as suggested by the debate over the Taylor Rule’s implication of a negative federal funds rate. Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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evidence regarding the real-world dynamics of group decision making under conditions of pervasive 
uncertainty.18 
 
THE FOMC DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF THE 1990s PRODUCTIVITY 
ACCELERATION 
In the 1990-91 recession, productivity tended to be less discussed at FOMC meetings—perhaps 
because disagreements over projections of the trend growth rate of potential output seemed less important 
during a recession.  During the early stages of the economy recovery, as the economy strengthened, a 
discussion about trend productivity once again arose again. In particular, at the August 1992 meeting, 
then Minneapolis Fed President Gary Stern and Greenspan questioned David Stockton (Associate 
Director of Research) about the staff’s estimated growth rate of potential real GDP and its decomposition 
(productivity and labor). Stockton reported that the staff estimated that the growth rate of trend 
productivity and labor input were each 1 percent. Greenspan asked Stockton if the staff thought that the 
growth of trend labor productivity might be higher than 1 percent. Stockton replied that the early stages of 
an economic recovery were not the ideal time to separate trend estimates from the traditionally-strong 
cyclical rebound in productivity that occurs for a while after the recession ends: 
MR. STOCKTON: . . . it's difficult to pin down what the trend in fact is. The good productivity 
performance that we've seen thus far in the recovery is not inconsistent with normal cyclical 
behavior if one were to assume a trend of 1 percent. That is in some sense how we infer what the 
trend is. But one could certainly say that at this stage we don't know how much of this 
restructuring is actually accomplishing some underlying improvement in trend productivity and 
how much of it is just simply using the existing work force more effectively as firms always do in 
a cyclical recovery. So, there's certainly a possibility that it could be better, but I wouldn't bet on it 
at this point. If one thinks back to where we were in the early '80s, coming out of that recession 
there was a tendency, I think, for many people to overestimate the improvement in productivity. 
There was talk then that the trend had improved to maybe 2 percent or in excess of 2 percent and it 
turned out to be a disappointment that as we progressed through the decade we didn't see that kind 
of improvement. So, I think it's always difficult when you see the good increases in productivity 
early on [in a recovery] to know exactly how much is trend and how much is cyclical. 
Anecdotal Evidence 
                                                      
18 See the conference volume “Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty,” for a recent treatment of this topic. The papers 
can be accessed at: http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/article/6547.  Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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It appears that anecdotal evidence from business contacts played a key early role in shaping Greenspan’s 
views about the structural changes in the economy stemming from the new technologies emanating from 
the microprocessor. A few months later, this anecdotal evidence begins to shape his views about the 
productivity statistics published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Accordingly, it becomes apparent that 
Greenspan is having some qualms about the staff’s estimates of trend productivity growth. The FOMC’s 
learning experience with regard to the productivity acceleration began in earnest at the December 22, 
1992, meeting.  Chairman Greenspan offered a lengthy discourse on a possible shift in trend productivity 
growth, chastising the staff and Committee members.  Greenspan said that advances in high-technology 
and telecommunications equipment may be starting to provide productivity dividends because of software 
development. This was about seven years before the BEA officially incorporated business outlays for 
software in its estimates of nonresidential fixed investment in October 1999. Although lengthy, we 
include his remarks here in their entirety because of its historical significance in setting the stage for 
repeated FOMC policy discussions throughout the 1990s: 19 
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN:  One of the more interesting aspects of what is going on at the  
moment—it's something that a number have alluded to—is that we basically have a productivity-
driven recovery . . . The outlook for that particular variable is really quite critical to a number of 
the issues that have been raised around this table. There is an interesting question as to whether, in 
fact, we can have continued strong growth without employment growth. Obviously, theoretically 
we can. The question really gets to the issue of whether or not this productivity surge we've been 
looking at is abnormal or not. 
There are essentially two hypotheses about what those increases are attributable to, both of which 
could turn out to be right. The first is that the level of output per work hour at the bottom of the 
recession was quite low relative to the inputs of both physical capital and human capital. In a sense 
that's saying that the economy was not operating at an efficient level relative to its inputs. In that 
case, by just tightening up one can very readily reduce labor input and create within a certain 
range a rise in output per work hour. One presumes that that can continue to increase until we run 
up to the upper edge of that range, meaning that the existing capital, both physical and human, is 
being employed at its most efficient levels. 
The second possibility here is that the norm of long-term productivity growth … has tilted 
upward. In that case, we're not looking at 1 percent or slightly more than 1 percent [as the norm], 
but conceivably all of a sudden something has occurred which has changed the longer-term 
productivity growth [trend]. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that there is at least something to 
that.  Jerry [Corrigan], I don't know if you remember that breakfast where we had a very 
interesting representation of manufacturing corporations who were raising the point that this 
restructuring that is going on had only really begun, which is the same issue that you were getting 
                                                      
19 In general, the quoted text from the FOMC transcripts in this article has been lightly edited to reduce its length, 
and formatted into paragraphs to improve readability. Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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from the New York [business leaders]. It strikes me that what may be happening—and say 
"may"—is that we have looked for years and years for the significant impact of productivity 
growth coming off the major computer input in telecommunications and high-tech capital assets 
and, as you may recall, we got very little of it. I think the reason is that we did not have the 
software. Essentially we could not really employ that degree of computational power without a 
major upswing in the analytic capabilities in using the equipment. In the last five or six years, or 
maybe a little longer, there has been a very dramatic increase in applicable software. One need 
only look at the stock market price of Microsoft to see the market valuation of this particular asset 
coming on stream. The people Jerry and I were talking to at the breakfast were talking about 
[unintelligible] systems manufacturing. I remember one of the people there was an old friend of 
mine from a company called which used to put DC motors into the rolling mills of a lot of the 
steel operations: that was their market. So, I raised the question: Is the big steel business now 
basically heavily DC motors? And he said "We don't even think that way anymore. What we think 
of is complete computer operating systems of manufacturing." If you go around and speak to 
people, what you find is that in the last two or three years there has been a major change in the 
way manufactured goods are created. And if you look at the data in the nonmanufacturing area, we 
are finally beginning to see some definite quickening in output per work hour in that area as well. 
If this is the beginning of something of quite important significance, the question is whether it is in 
fact saying that our potential GDP is being underestimated. Something may be going on here. The 
trouble is that we will not be able to know that for a while. It is quite conceivable that part of the 
problem that we're looking at is that the marginal cost of adding new people is so great at this 
stage that it may be creating somewhat of an illusion about the relationship between capital and 
labor: it may be creating an attitude on the part of a number of managers that they just will not hire 
new people except under duress because the obvious medical costs, employment training, and all 
the other costs are very large. And the big upswing in the temporary employment rolls is really 
quite impressive and clearly out of line with what the previous history of temporary employment 
has been.  
So, we may have a technical problem here which is obscuring what is going on and may be 
making it appear to be a much bigger issue than it is. But what is certainly the case, if the 
Greenbook GDP figures are right or if those figures are any stronger than that, is that we are going 
to get one of two scenarios. One is that we will get a very marked increase in actual employment 
growth, because it's difficult to imagine the average workweek going very much higher than it is. 
And if we are at the upper ranges of productivity growth, then the arithmetic of the system 
basically says that it all falls out to increased employment. The alternate scenario is that we are 
badly missing a major secular change in the productivity trend, in which case this is going to work 
out somewhat differently. It's not clear to me how it will play out in the sense that we do know that 
without a significant increase in employment. . .  
Productivity was a popular topic, thereafter, at most Committee meetings. At the February 2-3, 1993, 
meeting, members noted 1992’s 3 percent increase in labor productivity and challenged the staff’s 
forecast of a slowdown to a 1.3 percent pace.  In response, the staff noted that the 1.3 percent pace, in 
fact, was itself an increase from their previous projection of only a 1 percent trend growth rate.  Little was 
said regarding productivity at the March meeting except the Chairman’s comment that “Productivity is 
picking up in a fairly substantial way, and I suspect it is basically real.”  Inside the corridors of the Federal 
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continued to see roughly 1 to 1.5 percent trend productivity growth, and those, like himself, who saw 
revolutionary changes occurring in the U.S. business sector. Productivity was little discussed during 
subsequent meetings until Governor Angell expressed his frustration at the August 1993 meeting: 
I really just don't understand productivity. I don't understand how we can have a decline in 
productivity for the business sector of 1-1/2 and 2-1/2 percent two quarters in a row when 
productivity in manufacturing has been rising at 4-1/2 to 5 percent! Somebody is doing very, very 
poorly; and if anyone knows who it is—who really snuffing on the job—they haven't been spotted 
yet. So, that is indeed a real puzzle.  
At the following meeting in September, Governor Angell noted that the recent revisions to the national 
income accounts had worsened the productivity-trend puzzle. Chairman Greenspan also made clear his 
suspicion of the incoming data: 
I'm inclined to believe that when we look back at this period with the better annualized data, 
which may be a year or two years from now, it's going to look better because we can't have the 
unemployment rate declining, the initial claims falling and, as Governor Mullins said, a tight labor 
market with average hours of work moving up, and have declining productivity. It just doesn't 
make sense.  Something is wrong with the data system, and I suspect—or I hope—that eventually 
that will get resolved.  
I'd say the economy is moving [up at a rate] that has to be over 2 percent at this point, maybe 2-1/2 
percent. I realize that this may seem to be making the figure look the way I think policy ought to 
run, but since I don't sense that anybody out there is talking in terms of any radical changes, I 
won't press this issue. 
The public began to see an inkling of this emerging debate inside the Federal Reserve in the 
Chairman’s December 1994 speech to the Economic Club of Chicago. Although much of the speech was 
devoted to a discussion of rising worker insecurity, Greenspan argued that the Schumpeterian process of 
creative destruction lay behind new production processes and new types of goods and services that were 
displacing obsolete ones. Citing work by Stanford University Professor Paul David, Greenspan noted that 
there was usually a long lag between significant technological innovations and rising productivity and 
living standards. One example he cited was the adoption of electrical power, which gradually replaced 
power generated by water- and steam-driven processes. “Computer-based technologies” were a 
technology with similar economy-wide implications, leading to a “conceptualization of output” 
characterization. For example, the mainframe computer industry moved from larger corporate enterprises 
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Sharply falling semi-conductor prices would allow smaller businesses to embrace computer 
technology that had previously been limited to large firms. In addition, these new technologies allowed 
large firms to reorganize in ways similar to the historical introduction of fractional horsepower electric 
motors. In the aggregate, these new general purpose technologies, as seen in Figure 4, began to boost the 
growth rate of multi-factor, or total, productivity (MFP). The design and adoption of Toyota’s just-in-time 
inventory system and Wal-Mart’s sales tracking and distribution system are two oft-cited examples of the 
application of new technologies that revolutionized the way that businesses were organized and operated. 
The products they produced would also change. In short, Greenspan believed that these changes muddied 
the data, thereby biasing estimates of output and thus productivity. While undoubtedly a positive 
development, Greenspan also fervently believed that these innovations clouded the perceptions of 
economists and economic policymakers about the economy’s true performance.  
[Insert Figure 4] 
At the December 19, 1995, FOMC meeting, Chairman Greenspan offered “a broad hypothesis about 
where the economy is going over the longer term and what the underlying forces are.”  He argued that 
anecdotal evidence from industry-level sources suggested that purchases of equipment and software were 
changing businesses in fundamental ways.  Embracing the research of Professor David (1989), and noting 
the shortcomings of the productivity statistics, Greenspan emphasized that major technological 
innovations usually take a long time to have their full impact on productivity as businesses reorganize to 
take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by the new technology. Becoming increasingly 
convinced about the permanence of this technological change, Greenspan launched into a rather long 
discourse about “the extraordinary impact of accelerating technologies” that was couched in historical 
terms: 
I have a suspicion that in this period, unlike previous periods, we will find that the long-run, deep-
seated forces are not so gradual as to be readily dismissed in any short-term economic evaluation. 
I suspect that the evidence is increasingly emerging that there is something different going on, 
which we have not looked at for awhile.  One would certainly assume that we would see this in the 
productivity data, but it is difficult to find it there. In my judgment there are several reasons, the 
most important of which is that the data are lousy. I think we have not correctly defined how to 
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at market values, we are not capitalizing various types of activities properly. In the past, we looked 
at capital expenditures only as spending on a blast furnace or a steel rolling mill. Now, 
improvement in the value of a firm is influenced by such factors as how much in-house training 
they have and what type. That creates economic value in the stock-market sense, and we are not 
measuring it properly. . .  
While the analogies are not exact, there is something extraordinarily obvious as we read through 
what he [Paul David] is saying and observe what is going on now. Firms are putting tremendous 
efforts into computer technology. A lot of it is wasted, as inevitably it must be, and we still have 
not restructured vast parts of the way we do business to fit a fundamentally new technology. It is 
going to take a long while to do that. It is unclear exactly how that fits into our policy process. But 
I think it is important to put this point on the table, and I present this as a hypothesis since it is 
something that we will not be sure is the appropriate assessment of our changing world for 
probably five to ten years.  
For the Chairman, rapid increases in business profits, which were being driven by strong 
corporate earnings, and thus reflected in rising stock prices, were signaling gains in productivity beyond 
those evident in published data.20  As former Fed Governor Laurence Meyer (2004) asserted in his book, 
Greenspan’s view of the nascent acceleration in productivity growth was formed largely by both his 
numerous contacts in the business sector and his abiding belief that the published aggregate data were not 
correctly measuring the effects of information technological innovations that businesses were claiming to 
have garnered.  With few exceptions, Greenspan views were discounted by both the Board’s staff 
economists and his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).  But the Chairman was 
not dissuaded.  He noted, for example, that available data suggested that the service sector had achieved 
no productivity gain in twenty years, an unlikely event.  If this measurement was wrong, how many more 
were incorrect? 
Research Evidence 
Greenspan’s doubts about the reliability of the productivity and cost data also led him to doubt the 
reliability of the staff’s model-based forecasts of structural productivity. Resolving an apparent tension 
between the anecdotal data on the one hand, and the hard data and model-based estimates on the other 
                                                      
20 The indicator value of increasing profits as a signal of increased productivity has a long history; see, for example, 
comments by Richmond Reserve Bank president Edward Boehne during the February 1983 FOMC meeting.  The 
Board staff’s productivity trend rate, as of February 1983, was approximately 1 percent, vs. 2-1/2 percent earlier in 
the post-war period.  The Board staff was forecasting actual productivity growth of 2-1/2 percent in 1983 and 1-1/2 
percent in 1984, driven by manufacturing with not as much going on in the services sector.  In the FOMC 
transcripts, Board research director Kichline notes that some interesting things happened in 1982. One is that 
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hand, spurred the Chairman to commission a significant research project to assess the accuracy of the 
BLS’ published productivity statistics. In 1996, out of frustration with existing data, Chairman Greenspan 
asked Carol Corrado and Larry Slifman to conduct an in-depth study of the quality of existing data.  
Greenspan’s charge to Corrado and Slifman was to examine productivity figures by business sector. 
According to Woodward (2000), he also requested a study of productivity growth in the services-
producing sectors, where little or no productivity gains had been found in the last two decades.  Was 
incorrectly-measured data to blame? Since nominal gross sales and nominal value added likely were 
observed with at most modest measurement error, suspicion fell primarily on incorrect price indexes for 
the sectors’ outputs which caused deflated real output to be too small.  Although Greenspan had been 
questioning the productivity figures for a while, it appeared that he had convinced few, if any, of his 
fellow FOMC members.  
The results of these research studies suggested that measured productivity growth in unincorporated 
services-producing businesses had decreased during the last two decades by approximately one-half 
percent per year. Few found this plausible in reality. The Corrado-Slifman study thus proved to be a 
significant piece of evidence confronting the FOMC, because it revealed significant limitations of the 
published data.  Indeed, Greenspan (2007) would later admit that the Corrado-Slifman study was the key 
piece of research evidence he used against those who, using the staff’s model embodied with flawed data, 
advocated an immediate hike in the federal funds rate to quell the potential for rising inflation pressures.21  
Greenspan would later note that “this was a classic example of why you can’t just decide monetary policy 
based on an econometric model.” (Greenspan, 2007, p. 174) Perhaps just as importantly, subsequent 
revisions to published aggregate BLS data converged to the more rapid growth suggested by the 
Chairman’s anecdotal, firm-level data. 
An interesting question is whether “anecdotal evidence” is an adequate basis for formulating national 
monetary policy. Clearly, the professional staff thought not. Yet, there was statistical evidence supporting 
                                                      
21 See Woodward (2000) for a detailed discussion of this episode and the mechanics of the 1996 internal study, 
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the Chairman’s views; a number of published studies had explored the growing importance of IT in 
business.  For example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt’s (1996) paper had been written in 1993 and presented at a 
number of workshops, including the Federal Reserve.  In their article, they argue that previous studies 
which had concluded that computers added nothing to total output were flawed because those authors 
sought to measure the impact of computers by searching for excess stock returns in firms with high IT-
related investment.  In equilibrium, however, efficient markets theory argues that firms which spend more 
on IT capital should not have higher rates of return on equity than other firms.  Rather than compare 
stocks prices and earnings, they fit an economic production-theory, input-demand model to data collected 
during five annual surveys, 1987–1991, of several hundred large firms.  They conclude that the “…gross 
marginal product for computer capital averaged 81 percent for the firms in our sample.”  Subtracting 
typical annual depreciation of approximately 30 percent, annual net yields to IT investment averaged 
nearly 50 percent over those five years.  Dewan and Min (1997) analyzed the same data for 1988-1992 
using a more flexible input demand model.  They noted that IT capital, for their sample firms, was 2 
percent of total capital outlays in 1982 but nearly 16 percent by 1994, motivated by a 20 percent average 
annual rate of decline in the quality-adjusted price of IT capital from 1960–1992.  Their estimated the 
gross marginal return for their median firm was similar to Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996).  
Ramirez and Melville (1998) examined a panel of 517 publicly traded firms.22  The firms’ IT capital 
stock as a share of tangible assets increased from approximately 2 percent in 1987 to 8 percent in 1996, 
and the annual growth rate of IT capital as a share of total tangible capital accelerated to a 46 percent pace 
during 1992–1994, from 13 percent during 1987–1992.  Among these firms, the increase in the average 
per-firm IT capital stock differed little between manufacturing-sector and service-sector firms. 
Disaggregating further, however, they found that the IT capital stocks of service-sector firms in the 
“transportation, communications, utilities” sector were twice as large as the manufacturing-sector firms.  
                                                      
22 Ramirez and Melville (1998) examine large U.S. firms drawn from the Fortune 1,000 list.  While 1694 firms are 
observed for at least one year, only 517 firms are observed in all 10 years.  Average revenue, profit and number of 
employees of these firms aligns well with figures for both the Fortune 500 and 1,000 firms.  Seventy variables are 
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Measured relative to corporate revenues (gross output), service-sector firms other than retail and 
wholesale trade also were more IT-intensive than manufacturing.  Finally, measured per employee, 
services-sector firms were almost twice as IT-capital intensive as manufacturing firms.  Gurbaxani, 
Melville and Kraemer (1998) find that a higher degree of networking within the firm, closely related to 
the use of PCs, has strong positive returns.   
The above studies of IT capital in large firms were approximately contemporaneous with FOMC 
deliberations during the early 1990s (especially considering the lag between authorship and publication).  
Later studies of IT strategies at large firms during 1987–1996 reached similar conclusions.23 While 
speculative, it seems reasonable that at least some FOMC members had heard similar messages—if not 
from academics, then at least from their contacts in the business community. Still, it seems apparent from 
the transcripts that discussions surrounding the empirical findings and implications of recent academic 
papers are very rare in the policy discussion.  
Meanwhile, the Board staff remained skeptical about a productivity acceleration due to IT 
investment. This was apparent in the Board’s February 1997 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. 
However, at the February 4, 1997, FOMC meeting, which occurred prior to the Chairman’s testimony and 
public release of the report, Greenspan had been somewhat more blunt in response to suggestions that 
productivity growth had not picked up as much as he asserted: 
So, the productivity gains implicit in these data [anecdotal reports] are larger than the ones we are 
getting in the official data. The one thing we know about the official data on productivity is that 
they are wrong. 
Wynne (2002) notes that not until 1998 did indications appear in public that the FOMC was becoming 
confident of an increase in trend productivity.  A year later, in the February 1998 Monetary Policy Report 
to the Congress, the Board staff wrote that higher levels of IT investment “may finally be translating” into 
faster trend productivity growth. In the July 1998 Report, the Board noted that productivity growth had 
picked up to approximately 1½ percent per year on average over the previous three years.  
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THE NEW ECONOMY COMES INTO FOCUS AND BEGINS TO CONFRONTS INFLATION 
Throughout the 1998 transcripts, the FOMC’s familiar model of inflation was evident.  Seldom in the 
Committee’s discussions are views expressed that prices of significant goods and services are set by 
supply and demand.   Rather, prices are set as a sticky markup over unit labor costs which, in turn, are 
algebraically determined by wage rates minus labor productivity. Wages, unlike goods prices, are 
sensitive to imbalances between demand and supply—“excessive” demand for labor induces increases in 
wage rates beyond increases in labor productivity, leading to inflation.  Although explicit statements are 
few, implicitly the Committee appears to have adopted the familiar textbook microeconomic model in 
which each firm produces near the bottom of its average cost curve, and industries display constant-
returns-to-scale behavior due to entry and replication of existing firms (of minimum efficient scale). 
At the February 3-4, 1998, meeting, the Federal Reserve Board research director (Mike Prell) noted 
“The projected growth of output is slower than potential, and thus we anticipate an easing of pressures on 
resources. …favorable supply conditions--including strong productivity gains and the availability of 
cheap imports—will be restraining price increases as the economy expands moderately.” The staff 
projected slightly slower productivity growth during 1998, as the economy slowed, with a return to trend 
growth in 1999.  But the meeting also contains an enlightening discussion between Mr. Prell, the Board’s 
deputy research director David Stockton, and Chairman Greenspan regarding the dynamic relationships 
between labor compensation and productivity, a discussion immediately relevant to the Committee’s 
scheme for projecting productivity growth: 
Greenspan:  How significant is the correlation between nominal compensation and productivity? 
Mr. Prell: I don’t know the answer to that question, but I suspect the correlation is very weak in 
the short run. In fact, we get some of our largest compensation increases when productivity 
increases are beginning to fall near the end of a cyclical expansion. 
Mr. Stockton: One can put nonfarm business productivity into a wage equation and actually see 
whether or not productivity is an important factor explaining nominal wage gains. The statistical 
effect turns out to be marginally significant at best. We know that real wage aspirations, loosely 
based on productivity, ought to be an important factor in conditioning wage demands, but 
businesses may not be willing to grant the wage increases. To the extent that fluctuations in 
productivity do not show up in wages, the first round effects will show through to profit margins 
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Chairman Greenspan: The reason I ask the question is actually the reverse; it relates to anecdotal 
indications that when nominal wages are beginning to accelerate, then business escalates its efforts 
to reduce costs and improve productivity.  So, if that model were functioning in a meaningful 
sense, then a significant rise in nominal wages could very well merely reflect the fact that 
productivity was rising and therefore unit labor costs were not. 
This exchange highlights a crucial aspect of the Committee’s framework for discussion:  To what extent 
are wages predetermined almost completely independent of expected future productivity?  To what extent 
are changes in productivity likely to affect inflation? As we will discover, in a couple of years this 
discussion will come to dominate the FOMC’s policy discussions as it attempts to discern inflation trends. 
Several Reserve Bank presidents discussed inflation in similar terms: Changes in supply conditions, 
including fluctuations in productivity growth, affect inflation—not imbalances in the demand and supply 
of goods and services.  San Francisco president Parry notes “It is likely that economic activity is being 
boosted and inflation held is being held back to some extent by a positive productivity shock.” 
Philadelphia president Boehne noted “…the disinflation process has had surprising staying power. Wage 
gains continue to be offset by productivity gains, so inflation is falling while corporate profits remain 
high. … If businesses cannot get more volume out of existing resources, they undertake additional rounds 
of downsizing.” Governor Phillips expresses a somewhat more cautious view: “Although increases in 
compensation costs have been offset by increases in productivity, it is questionable as to how long that 
process can continue. Since the U.S. economy is service-oriented and costs are under pressure in that 
sector, it is hard to believe that aggregate inflation will be held at bay forever…” 
As of this meeting (Feb. 1998), staff estimates are nonfinancial corporate productivity growth at a 
2.1 percent in the fourth quarter and cumulative Q4/Q4 1997 of 3.2 percent—a full percentage point 
higher than the same four-quarter period during 1996. Chairman Greenspan, in his remarks to the 
Committee, emphasizes a model in which wages are determined almost exclusively by labor market 
conditions and productivity simply reduces the pass-through of such wages into unit labor costs and, via a 
markup, into prices. Speaking of possible new demand from Asia, he notes “The only thing that can keep 
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Productivity gains clearly have kept increases in unit labor costs at a very modest level; indeed, the latter 
have shown no signs of accelerating during the last several quarters.” 
The March 31, 1998, meeting begins with a mea culpa between Prell and Greenspan, acknowledging 
Greenspan’s previous-meeting insistence that the staff’s real GDP growth forecast was too low. But a 
conundrum persists: the staff GDP growth forecast has increased to a 3.1 percent pace, but labor markets 
are even tighter—combined, the staff forecasts imply a decrease in first-quarter labor productivity at a 
negative 2.2 percent rate. Prell argues that such a drop is not “implausible” given the increase in labor 
productivity during the previous two years relative to the staff’s underlying trend: “If we have it right, a 
movement back toward the trend line was to be expected over time—and, given the erratic character of 
the series, a substantial drop in some quarter would be far from shocking.” Prell further notes that the 
BEA measures productivity from the expenditure side of the national income accounts, and that the 
income side has been growing more rapidly—perhaps suggestive of measurement error. He also notes 
that GDP growth at 4 or 5 percent “is not totally implausible.”  
The discussion continues as other presidents contribute stories of productivity improvement, but all 
lead the members to the same point: extreme uncertainty surrounds both the near-term and long-run trend 
in productivity.  Several members note that the staff’s labor market projections, combined with the 
productivity projection, imply sharp increases in unit labor costs and, given the Committee’s markup 
pricing analytical framework, inflation—the staff’s projection for productivity implies a projected 3 
percentage point increase in core CPI and core PCE price indexes. Governor Meyer is among the most 
concerned: “[these] latter developments, interacting with a slowdown in productivity growth, suggest the 
potential for a less benign than projected path of labor costs in coming quarters. Looking to 1999, I also 
am concerned that there might be a somewhat sharper reversal in the supply shocks than projected by the 
staff.”  Events were to prove Governor Meyer’s concern unfounded, as productivity accelerated.  
Chairman Greenspan expanded on an earlier comment, by noting that “the productivity numbers are 
reasonably strong and the absence of pricing power is still very much a factor in holding down inflation.” 
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switch to an asymmetric directive, saying in the minutes: “but additional improvements in productivity 
growth could not be counted on to offset further increases in the rate of growth of labor compensation, 
which were more likely to occur if labor markets were to tighten further.”  
The May 1998 meeting brought few surprises. Once again, the staff projected slower gains in 
productivity moving forward, interpreted as a risk of increased inflationary pressure. At same time, 
responding to data revisions, the staff increased their estimate of trend, or structural, productivity growth 
to a 1-1/2 pace—but, as typical of such revisions, the revision was cautiously small. This change once 
again highlighted a tension in the Committee’s learning of more rapid productivity growth:  Why should 
it be expected that an increase in trend productivity growth will reduce trend increases in unit labor costs 
and prices, when economic theory suggests that long-run increases in wages and productivity move 
together (indeed, are simultaneously determined)?  Some Committee members were skeptical, including 
vice chairman McDonough, but Chairman Greenspan re-emphasizes his faith in the productivity 
acceleration: “The more interesting data provide increasing evidence that the underlying trend of 
productivity is moving up.” Discarding the noncorporate sector as having data of questionable accuracy, 
Greenspan advocates adjusting hours data for the length of pay periods—doing so suggests that labor 
productivity accelerated during the previous two years from a 2.7 percent to a 3.2 percent rate.  The first 
quarter’s rate is 3.4 percent. The chairman concludes that the trend has increased relative to the distant 
past but is holding steady because of a pickup in capital deepening, and some acceleration in TFP. He also 
reinforces his view that the structural break in trend productivity occurred in 1995.  
Regarding the supply side effects of productivity growth, the June meeting is “more of the same.”  
However, this meeting is important because Chairman Greenspan introduces his somewhat ironic concept 
of a “virtuous wealth cycle” wherein gains in productivity engender increases in inflation, rather than 
decreases. Since this view, eventually, comes to dominate the Committee’s discussion, it is worth quoting 
at length: 
Everyone has been wrong by underestimating domestic demand and wrong in the other direction 
by overestimating inflation. The area where the error is crucial has been productivity because as 
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up. This has created a major increase in stock prices and a virtuous circle wealth effect. We end up 
with (1) much higher domestic demand and (2) lower prices because of the acceleration in 
productivity that has occurred. The Greenbook forecast incorporates a significant slowdown in 
earnings growth, which in turn comes largely from a slowdown in productivity gains. If that 
happens, then the growth in spending on capital goods also slows and that creates some negative 
internal multipliers that conform total spending to the Greenbook forecast of much slower 
expansion of demand. The only thing that presumably could keep the stock market on a rising 
trend is that we are wrong again on productivity. That would mean that earnings expectations, 
which are now in the area of 13 or 14 percent over the five-year time frame used by security 
analysts, would continue to move up, stock prices would continue to move up, and effective 
demand would continue to rise quite substantially. The unanswered question is what would 
happen to inflation in that context. That is why I think the crucial error in our forecast models has 
been the productivity numbers. I believe it is a mistake to view the issue of having been wrong on 
the real side independently of also having been wrong on the inflation side. 
Via this mechanism, virtuous increases in labor productivity generate increases in wealth that, in turn, 
generate increases in demand to absorb any increase in output.  But, to the extent that demand accelerates 
before supply, inflation pressures might increase, rather than decreases, when productivity accelerates.  
This somewhat counter-intuitive mechanism, with its unusually strong wealth effect in consumption, later 
will puzzle analysts and the public when the Committee increases its interest rate target at times of 
accelerating productivity.24 
 
RISING PRODUCTIVITY AND THE VIRTUOUS CYCLE RUN AMOK 
During the late 1990s, the staff inaugurated the practice of including longer-run simulations in the 
Bluebook as a complement to the shorter-run simulations contained in the Greenbook. In the staff’s 
simulation, which was reported by Don Kohn (then Director of Monetary Affairs), productivity growth 
was increased by 1 percentage point in 1999 and sustained at that level for a decade. Kohn notes that “The 
simulations provide the cautionary note that these favorable effects on inflation are temporary. … 
inflation will begin to pick up if unemployment is held at that lower rate, even if the trend in productivity 
is tilted up permanently.” In a twist, Kohn outlines a mechanism through which the more favorable 
productivity growth may tend to accelerate inflation—a mechanism that recurs in later Committee 
discussions: “A faster trend for productivity increases demand substantially, as the accelerator effects 
                                                      
24 For some perspectives on thoughts at the Board of Governors on the wealth effect during this period, see 
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associated with attempts to keep capital growing in pace with the more rapid growth in output cause 
investment to jump, and as consumption rises with permanent income. However, supply only picks up 
gradually, in line with faster productivity growth, and real interest rates must increase to forestall 
inflation.”  Via this mechanism—which recurs in Committee discussions—more rapid productivity 
growth is “bad” for the economy because it tends, via a wealth effect, to increase near-term aggregate 
demand more than supply, leading to inflation pressures that the Committee must combat with higher 
interest rates. 
Nevertheless, the year 1999 was to see little change in the Committee’s views, as incoming data 
reinforced their view that an increase in inflation was unlikely.  Chairman Greenspan noted the close 
correspondence between movements in labor compensation and productivity, leaving unit labor costs and 
inflationary pressures absent, as unit labor costs for nonfinancial corporations increased over the four 
quarters of 1998 just 0.2 percent, as compensation per hour rose 4 percent and productivity 3.8 percent. 
Although it is expected that in the long run labor will eventually capture the value of increased labor 
productivity, the Chairman saw a puzzle as to why, in the tight labor market, labor was not garnering 
more and why firms were not increasing prices more rapidly. The Chairman argues that a “fundamental” 
change has occurred in the economy, in part because of the forces of globalization. He further argues that 
the staff’s projections of increasing inflation are wrong and that the Committee should accept his 
projections rather than those of the staff.  His exposition is lengthy but, in our opinion, extraordinarily 
valuable because, in addition to persuading the Committee to delay policy tightening, it initializes the 
context for later Committee discussions of productivity and inflation that culminate in the “deflation 
scare” and “quantitative easing” of 2003: 
…we cannot find inflation in either the CPI or the PCE index for December, and we surely do not 
find it in the pipeline data anywhere in the system. I submit that interpreting these results requires 
a fundamental reassessment of how we look at the world.  
How is it possible, first, for hourly compensation growth to be flat or falling in an ever-tightening 
labor market? Let me begin by suggesting what does not explain it. You may recall that two or 
three years ago I was arguing that fear of job obsolescence was a major factor suppressing the 
nominal increase in compensation per hour. That factor clearly has not gotten worse; if anything, it 
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The evidence, anecdotal and otherwise, suggests that the explanation lies in pressure coming from 
employers, who have apparently lost virtually all pricing power—an issue that a number of you 
raised in our discussion yesterday. We saw quite similar episodes during the long period of the 
gold standard, which produced price stability on average prior to the 1930s, although obviously 
there was a lot of price volatility. During that period, wage increases were limited by the 
exogenous price capping of the gold standard. The technologically driven process that is breaking 
down barriers to cross-border trade today has apparently created an environment that simulates the 
old gold standard forces. One way of looking at this is that in earlier decades when there may have 
been excess capacity or excess potential in one part of the world, it didn’t matter because that 
excess could not be moved to another part of the world. But in the current more technologically 
advanced environment, as barriers come down we get an increase in potential supply relative to 
total actual physical capacity in the world economic system. And it is conceivable, but by no 
means provable, that globalization--the major force that people are talking about--may be having 
an impact on the price level, and our price measures may be reflecting that. It may also be, with 
regard to my previous discussion of compensation gains, that the data are capturing that 
phenomenon, although the argument I am making is global as distinct from a specific 
manufacturing issue. The argument is basically that tradable goods prices are being significantly 
held down by excess world capacity and that the arbitraging into the nontradable goods areas that 
occurs within economies, largely through wages, is the reason why service price inflation, which 
arguably has very little in the way of direct international globalization components, also has been 
restrained appreciably. In the United States this process has been augmented by a dramatic 
increase in the backlog of new technologies, which is an issue we have discussed in the past. This 
really gets down to the question of whether the synergies that have evolved over recent years have 
created a large pool of potential capital investments that firms can dip into to obtain a rate of 
return in excess of the cost of capital. We have seen considerable evidence of this in the sense that 
rates of return everywhere seem to be moving up. There has been a very interesting pickup since 
1994 in the average rate of price decline in the high-tech area of the economy. Through the early 
1990s, the deflator for computers, communications equipment, and other high-tech goods was 
going down at an annual rate of about 4 percent. Starting in 1994, the rate of price decline fell off 
the chart, and the most recent data suggest that high-tech prices are dropping at an annual rate 
somewhere in the area of 17 to 18 percent. Thus, even though that sector’s share of GDP is only a 
few percent, these price declines are having an appreciable influence on the overall inflation rate. 
What this implies is that we are getting a rapid increase in opportunities for investment in new 
technology. It is overwhelming the expansion of demand, and the acceleration in the downward 
adjustment of prices suggests that we have a very large backlog of unexploited investments that, 
as they are implemented, are displacing labor and effectuating a very significant increase in 
multifactor productivity. That in turn has spilled over into labor productivity. Indeed, estimates 
produced by the staff’s econometric model suggest that we have seen a fairly dramatic pickup in 
recent years in multifactor productivity consistent with this process. I don’t believe that transitory 
factors can explain the failure of models to forecast successfully in recent years. I suspect that 
what we have here is a missing variable, if I may put it that way. Certainly, judging from the 
slowing in the rate of PCE inflation, supply generally appears to be overwhelming demand despite 
the evident continued decline in unemployed job seekers. 
As usual, Committee members express little disagreement with the Chairman’s analysis. St. Louis Federal 
Reserve President William Poole sees the causal mechanism differently. Seeking to place the maintenance 
of low inflation at the forefront, ahead of the productivity gains, he argues capital deepening and 
subsequent productivity gains are the result of low, stable inflation expectations: 
We need to be talking not just about the setting of the federal funds rate, but about the policy 
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The ideal situation, if we knew how to do it, would be to peg the rate of inflation at a very low 
level and go for price stability, letting the real economy run wherever it wants to run. What we 
would all like to see happen is to have the maximum possible employment and productivity 
growth consistent with price stability. The problem is that there seems to be so much evidence that 
the real economy leads the cyclical process, with inflation coming later. We should not ignore the 
anecdotes about very tight labor markets. Credit conditions and monetary growth are both very 
clearly on the stimulative side. The financial turmoil that motivated this Committee last fall [the 
Russian bond default] appears to be mostly behind us. Over the course of this year, starting 
sometime this spring, I think it is going to be appropriate to be tightening up on the funds rate.  
 
At the March 1999 meeting, the staff increased its estimate of trend labor productivity growth, albeit only 
by one-tenth of a percentage point, beginning in 1995. The staff’s new estimate of structural productivity 
growth in early 1999 was 1.9 percent, which was appreciably higher than the average of private sector 
forecasters surveyed by the Philadelphia Fed (as seen in Figure 2). Private sector forecasters, like many 
“new-economy skeptics” on the FOMC, appeared to be late to revise upward their estimates of structural 
productivity. In 2000, they boosted their trend productivity estimate by nearly 1 percentage point to 2.6 
percent—a huge increase. Noting the possibility of accelerations in productivity, Board research director 
Mike Prell warned the Committee that such a development might require higher interest rates to forestall 
inflation, as gains in demand outstrip greater supply. 
Some FOMC Members expressed reservations regarding the certainty that more rapid productivity 
growth will continue. Boston Reserve Bank President Minehan noted the Board staff’s trend rate of 
productivity growth during the last several years, first fell to less than 1 percent and then about doubled. 
The Chairman seeks to rally members to his viewpoint by acknowledging past errors—in part because of 
the “missing variable” he noted at the previous meeting.  He is now assuring members that the staff now 
has it correct. Moreover, the Chairman returns to his view that the data are flawed and therefore providing 
a misleading view of labor productivity trends: 
For quite a while our Greenbook and indeed all models have been projecting slower economic 
growth and higher inflation than actually have materialized. Looking back, it is conceivable and 
perhaps likely that the major explanation for these projection errors is that the models have missed 
the extent of the acceleration in productivity. By that I mean that the cyclically adjusted rate of 
increase in productivity, as now shown in the data, has been rising appreciably since the mid-
1990s. The evidence of this in the underlying data is fairly clear-cut. That is, the speed-up of 
productivity growth can explain to a large extent both the significant acceleration in GDP from the 
supply side, as a number of you have indicated, and the suppression of unit labor costs and total 
unit costs more generally, which in turn explains the softness in inflation. . . I think the question 
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The difficulty that I have in looking at overall business sector productivity is an issue that we have 
discussed previously, namely that the measurements we see in the corporate and the noncorporate 
areas cannot be reconciled. The margins of noncorporate profits, if I may use the term, are not bad. 
Yet the implicit output per hour number in total business sector productivity or nonfarm business 
sector productivity is picking up an implicit output per hour number in noncorporate business that 
has been declining, on balance, for two decades. For example, in industries where we have very 
significant amounts of noncorporate business—the legal profession, the medical profession, and 
business services—measured annual productivity has declined about 2 percent per annum on 
average since the late 1970s. That is just not credible. So, we have a major measurement error 
problem in the noncorporate area that distorts our view of what is happening to productivity.  
At the May 18 meeting, the staff added another ¼ point to their estimate of trend labor productivity 
growth, and, reflecting cyclical tightness, an additional ¼ point to the near-term forecast. Board research 
director Mike Prell summarizes the inflation outlook as quiescent for now but perhaps problematic for the 
future by noting that the staff and many bond market commentators believe that “the best news on 
inflation is behind us.” An unusually long discussion with Reserve Bank presidents follows. Typical is 
President Parry, who  seeks an estimate of the uncertainty of the productivity forecast:  
President Parry: Mike, I have two questions, and the first one is on productivity. Estimates of the 
productivity trend seem to have been revised quite frequently in the last few years. To me, this 
suggests greater uncertainty about the productivity forecast. Wouldn’t you have to conclude that 
the uncertainties associated with our forecast of real output and inflation must be greater given the 
uncertainties that are associated with the productivity forecast? 
Mr. Prell: If the locus of the uncertainty is productivity, I’m not sure that we are more uncertain 
about it now than we were three years ago or six years ago. I think there has always been a 
considerable band of uncertainty around the prospects for productivity. We were puzzled by why 
productivity gains were so low for many years. I guess I don’t feel any more uncomfortable on 
that score. The only way I feel uncomfortable is that, in a sense, we are moving a bit beyond the 
pack. But I think others are moving up their assessments of productivity trends, too, as they 
overcome the basic scientific skepticism reflected in the often heard statement that this recent 
experience isn’t yet a statistically significant deviation from the previous trends.  
The learning process of the Committee is highlighted as the Chairman seeks to deflect Reserve Bank 
presidents’ challenges to his (and the staff’s) forecast. The presidents questioned the staff’s ability to 
separate cyclical from structural changes in productivity growth—Chairman Greenspan had defined 
cyclical changes as firms’ efforts to expand output in the near term without increasing employment, and  
structural productivity as changes in business process such that the labor requirement per unit of output is 
permanently reduced. The Chairman admits that “ the truth of the matter is that I don’t see how we will 
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staff has gone too far with its increases in the trend rate, while at the same time admitting that “the staff’s 
pattern of incremental steps in trend productivity growth makes sense”:  
My problem with the staff forecast is that its projection of a 2¼ percent productivity trend over the 
forecast period [Note: the following 8 quarters] is just too aggressive for my taste. This revision to 
the productivity forecast basically drives their entire forecast. . . One question we have to ask is 
whether we have become sufficiently optimistic about the productivity trend going forward to 
justify keeping in place the full amount of the decline in the federal funds rate that was motivated 
by a forecast that has since been so significantly revised and by a set of financial conditions that 
have so dramatically improved. The second question we have to ask is whether we should 
maintain the current policy setting for the funds rate if growth continues strong and labor markets 
tighten further while inflation remains steady in the near term and is projected to increase 
thereafter. 
Governor Rivlin expressed similar skepticism.  Clearly, the selling of the idea of a “New Economy” with 
more rapid eternal productivity growth was going slowly. Monetary Affairs’ director Kohn and Chairman 
Greenspan, in part, agreed. Director Kohn noted that 4 percent output growth during the last four quarters 
had been fully accomplished with productivity gains and little labor market tightening, plus decreases in 
some broad measures of nominal wage and price increases.  
Chairman Greenspan walks a tightrope by echoing Kohn’s summary of the economy’s performance 
while acknowledging that dangerous imbalances are cumulating—tightening labor markets, strong 
productivity growth, and an absence of inflation. Greenspan responds much like he did in the previous 
meeting, by pointing to the rapid growth in productivity that was holding down unit labor costs and thus 
prices and bolstering earnings and productivity. Moreover, says the Chairman: 
The earnings forecasts and productivity growth rates may differ, but the two are interrelated. 
Because we are talking about a forecast with no change in labor’s share, an increase in expected 
earnings over five years has to show up either in an acceleration in the rate of inflation, in the rate 
of productivity growth, or in the rate of hours growth. The latter is extremely unlikely, strictly as a 
matter of demographics. There is very little evidence to date of a pickup in inflation expectations, 
and until very recently the notion regarding pricing power in the business sector has been 
uniformly that it is zero. Theoretically, it is possible that foreign affiliates are increasing their 
share of the earnings. But given what has happened to oil, that seems doubtful. . . Therefore, we 
are led to the conclusion that the earnings expectations are essentially projections of productivity 
growth.  
In a mild rebuttal, President Broaddus brings forward Chairman Greenspan’s own virtuous circle 
argument—now in favor of the policy tightening that the Chairman asks to defer: 
Mr. Chairman, my preference would be to go ahead and move the funds rate up ¼ percentage 
point today. To me it seems increasingly likely that trend productivity growth is rising. Some may 
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some households and businesses to expect higher incomes in the future. Some are going to try to 
act on that expectation now by borrowing to increase their spending even though the actual 
increase in output is not yet available. In that situation, interest rates need to rise to keep demand 
from becoming excessive. The extraordinary growth in domestic demand of late seems clear if one 
looks at a measure like private domestic final purchases, which grew at an annual rate of 7½ 
percent in the first quarter after growing at a rate of 6½ percent last year. That has to be above any 
reasonable estimate of the sustainable growth in output, and it is one reason for tightening policy. 
By the June 1999 meeting, the staff’s projection of trend, or structural, productivity growth was greater 
than other forecasters. Board Research director Mike Prell noted that the Council of Economic Advisers 
had increased its projection to a 1.6 percent rate, versus the Board staff’s 2-1/4 percent pace. Committee 
members appeared increasingly reluctant to accept further large increases in productivity’s trend. Chicago 
Fed President Moscow cites an academic study asserting that there has been no broad acceleration. 
Boston Fed President Minehan asserts an opposing position: “when I look at our track record at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and the track record of the Committee in general, we have been 
underestimating growth and overestimating inflation for some period of time.”25  The uncertainty of the 
relationship between the productivity acceleration and the economy’s underlying “equilibrium” real 
interest rate was raised by several members. Once again, Richmond Fed President Broaddus noted that 
higher structural productivity growth rates were a signal of higher future real incomes and thus 
expenditures and equilibrium real interest rates. [This is consistent with the discussion surrounding Figure 
3.] In his view, an increase in the FOMC’s nominal interest rate target was needed to preclude an easing 
                                                      
25 At this meeting, even a discussion of Humphrey-Hawkins money growth rate targets became entangled with 
productivity growth. Increasing productivity growth argued that more rapid money growth would be consistent with 
price stability. The Chairman argues against such an increase in target ranges because it would “inexorably” lead to 
a discussion of the staff’s process for developing productivity projections—a topic he did not care to debate or 
defend in public. Ironically, the Committee accepts the need for reduced disclosure and transparency. The Chairman 
says: “we have managed to take this whole issue [projecting productivity growth] off the table completely. If we 
change the [money] targets and we try to explain why, what of necessity is going to come out in the explanation is 
that we have changed our structural productivity growth measure from 1 to 2¼ percent, and that is something we 
have avoided doing. All we would be doing if we change them [money targets], as far as I can see, is to open us up 
to discussing what the staff’s trend productivity number is and then we’d get involved in defending it or not 
defending it. I feel like the politician who spends most of his time trying to avoid having certain questions asked. 
This is one of those questions I would just as soon not have raised because I think there are differences of view 
among the people in this room and it would serve no useful purpose of which I’m aware to get into this discussion.” 
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of monetary policy. Evidence for such a strong wealth effect, at least among materials presented to the 
Committee, was absent.26 
At the August meeting, cracks appear in the tide of sentiment regarding continued acceleration of 
productivity.  Concern that productivity growth may slow are amplified by simulations included in the 
Greenbook. The staff discussion surrounds predictions that inflation will accelerate if productivity slows 
and labor markets tightness remains. As some of the new-economy skeptics had been arguing, inflation 
began to accelerate in mid-1999 from the 1 to 2 percent rate seen from 1997 to early 1999, to 3 to 4 
percent from early 2000 to mid-2001. As a result, as seen in Figure 5, one-year ahead CPI inflation 
forecast errors, which were negative for most of the 1990s, began to turn positive in 2000. [NOTE: A 
negative forecast error means that actual inflation was less than forecasted inflation, or, equivalently, 
forecasters were consistently predicting inflation to be higher than what it turned out to be.]  
[Insert Figure 5] 
Suddenly, the Committee is faced with the prospect that slower productivity growth will engender 
more rapid inflation—when, only a few meetings previously, the concern was that faster productivity 
growth would engender more rapid inflation.  Was the productivity acceleration always bad news for the 
inflation outlook?  Governor Meyer’s comments are typical: 
I read the recent data as consistent with a continued momentum in aggregate demand that is likely 
to support growth at or above trend in the period immediately ahead and maintain very tight labor 
markets. I see core inflation stabilizing amid signs of a dissipation or reversal of many of the 
favorable supply shocks that have contributed to low and declining inflation over the last couple of 
years and stirrings, perhaps, of higher wage gains. This sets the stage for a test of the role of tight 
labor markets on inflation going forward . . . I expect we all look forward to learning a little more 
about just how new the new economy really is. The story in the Greenbook—and one that I can 
definitely relate to—is that the dissipation or reversal of favorable supply shocks, including the 
stabilization in trend productivity growth, will allow the effects of prevailing tightness in the labor 
market to show through. We will maintain growth at near trend over the forecast horizon with 
gradual upward pressure on inflation.  
 
Chairman Greenspan fights to hold the Phillips-curve inflation hawks at bay, while at the same time 
acknowledging the risks and uncertainty of predicting productivity growth. As before, he bases his 
argument on the nexus between productivity and unit labor costs. Holding the members together is 
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difficult; his lengthy, detailed remarks aptly demonstrate his strength as a consensus builder.  While we 
have edited lightly for brevity, the strength of his argument is appreciated by its detail. In the end, he 
grants the hawks a 25 basis point increase in the federal funds target: 
The point that I’m trying to make here is that we don’t have any real evidence that inflation has 
risen. Indeed, we are still looking at declining rates of increase in unit costs. And if profit margins 
are rising, that basically says that some of the increase in prices or the lack of decline in prices has 
to be reflected in widening profit margins. So there is still a gap there. In other words, the 
inflationary pressure is not there. Now, I don’t deny that if we proceed with the product-based 
GDP numbers and project a stable productivity growth rate, that will produce an acceleration in 
the CPI growth rate. There is no algebraically conceivable alternative to that. But that is begging 
the question, because unless and until we see some slowdown in productivity growth, then the 
argument that inflation is about to bite us is not credible. 
I do not deny, as I’ve said previously, that the growth of output per hour is going to slow down, 
but I don’t know when. There is no evidence of that yet, and there is no reasonable upper limit in 
the near term. The crucial point here is that we became so used to a 1 percent increase in 
productivity growth over a very long period of time—from the ’80s into the ’90s—that we have 
looked at the gap between potential and actual as entirely a demand-side phenomenon. . . But now 
we have the supply side moving, and the question of whether the economy is overheating and 
inflationary pressures are mounting cannot be strictly an issue of what is happening on the demand 
side. That’s because if productivity is accelerating, of necessity it has to be balanced in some 
manner, as I said last time, by very high expenditures for motor vehicles, housing, construction—
big everything—unless we get a big statistical discrepancy, bigger than the one we’re looking at 
now. 
The truth of the matter is that we have a very strong economy with very marginal indications of 
any slowing. But the question that is still up in the air is whether, in fact, it is an overheating 
economy. . . We know the gap between potential and real output is in the area of less than ½ 
percent without claiming any knowledge of what the actual potential is because we don’t need to 
know that. All we need to know is the difference. 
What I’m suggesting is that we still should be looking for the answer to the question of “Where is 
the inflation?” It is not showing up anywhere in the basic price data, at least that I can tell. And the 
people out in the business world with whom I talk, and it’s a fairly extensive group, keep 
complaining about their inability to raise prices. I do think that wages will continue to increase if 
productivity growth continues to rise. But since this would mean that unit labor costs would be 
little changed, that won’t be a source of price pressures. In any event, having said all of that, so far 
as the domestic side is concerned I think the availability of resources is very tight. Inflation is 
clearly prone to acceleration should the increase in the growth of productivity slow or even 
stabilize. That hasn’t happened yet as far as I can tell. . . My bottom line is that I think we have to 
tighten by 25 basis points.  
  
At the October 1999 meeting, members again expressed concerns that the policy risks were 
unbalanced toward higher inflation if the productivity acceleration was permitted to “run its course.”  The 
inflation hawks openly challenged the Chairman’s opinion that the risks, at worst, were balanced. In the 
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Governor Meyer argued that the broad outline of the forecast resembled his “typical” Board staff forecast 
since 1996, featuring slower growth and higher inflation. In his mind, the recent acceleration of output 
growth reflected favorable financial conditions and fiscal stimulus. No mention of the Greenspan virtuous 
cycle:   
By my count there are nine factors that contribute to higher inflation in this forecast: (1) tight labor 
markets today; (2) tighter labor markets around the corner; (3) rising capacity utilization rates; (4) 
a rebound in nonoil import prices; (5) the secondary effects of the sharp rise in energy prices this  
year; (6) a rebound in benefit costs; (7) an increase in the minimum wage; (8) an upward trend in 
nonoil commodity prices; and (9) the stabilization in trend productivity growth. There is an 
important partial offset from an assumed declined in energy prices over next year and the 
following year. But the cards seem stacked. To be sure, this is just a forecast. You might say, 
“Been there, done that!” [Laughter] Maybe productivity will accelerate further; I cannot rule that 
out. Maybe NAIRU is even lower than the staff estimate; it could be. . . But I find the Greenbook 
story line compelling. If it is wrong, it is likely to be a matter of degree rather than direction. 
 
The Chairman digs in his heals!  He is accepting none of this quiet rebellion. In a soliloquy so long that 
even taciturn Chairman Greenspan labels it “a long lecture,” he challenges the staff’s macroeconomic 
models and questions whether the models’ foundations are adequately dynamic to capture the 
extraordinary supply-side changes that he recognizes.  Recall that a few meetings earlier he was telling 
the FOMC members that the staff had finally got things right! He suggests that the staff and Committee 
members are misreading incoming economic data.  The passion and depth of feeling is revealed in a 
discussion framed in the language of calculus—perhaps a first for the FOMC—rather than the typically 
more circumspect language of seeking to balance risks.  The Chairman argues that correct policy action 
hinges on one’s judgment regarding the magnitude (and sign) of a second derivative. He implores the 
Committee to adopt his judgment that the staff models inadequately capture interactions between the 
demand and supply sides of the macro economy, and to maintain the federal funds rate target so long as  
evidence of increasing inflation is absent [the Chairman’s remarks are edited to reduce length]: 
We have a very difficult set of issues to evaluate. The reason relates largely to what I see as 
growing evidence that the models with which we have been trying to explain how the American 
economy functions are becoming increasingly obsolete. It is not that the econometric structure of 
the models is inappropriate, but certain simple assumptions are made in their structure that are  
driving the results we observe and are creating at least the presumption that we are missing 
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In my judgment our models fail to account appropriately for the interaction between the supply 
side and the demand side largely because historically it has not been necessary for them to do so. 
A crucial variable in our models is trend productivity growth, and the conventional procedure in 
our quarterly forecasts is to specify a constant trend rate of productivity growth. Yet, our official 
figures indicate that the growth in productivity has been moving up at an annual rate of around ½ 
percent each year since early 1997. On top of that, the review of 1995 to 1997 in retrospect is 
adding another 0.3 percentage point to the annual rate of growth in the most recent years. So what 
we have, in effect, is a set of trend productivity values whose second derivative has been positive. 
We have two choices. We can either project a continuation of the positive second derivative for 
productivity, or we can assume that the second derivative goes to zero and we will have a flat 
productivity growth rate. You may say that there are arguments for both. And indeed, as I will 
make a case in a moment, there are. But we have chosen the second automatically.  
What is the case for automatically assuming that the second derivative of productivity goes to 
zero? Certainly the most recent productivity data—whether we are looking at growth rates 
calculated on a four-quarter moving average basis, a two-quarter basis, or any other basis we want 
to use—do not confirm that assumption because all those data indicate that the rate of growth in 
productivity has been rising. Then the question is why this happens. When we engage in growth 
accounting analysis in an effort to get to the bottom of this, we find, as Governor Ferguson said, 
that there has been a very significant increase in capital deepening. That means, in effect, that we 
are getting very substantial acceleration in the growth of the stock of capital—or, to be more 
precise, capital services. In addition, we clearly are getting evidence of acceleration in multifactor 
productivity, the residual in growth accounting, which is another way of saying that the synergies 
of productivity-enhancing investments are coming together and in the process are creating an 
acceleration in productivity. What this implies, if it is true, is that we should be seeing a fairly 
marked upswing in profit margins or, another way of looking at it, in the ratio of profits to 
compensation or to a variety of other measures that productivity may spill into such as real wages. 
If we look at a breakdown of the supply side of the economy, what we end up with is that the total 
change in GDP is algebraically equal to structural productivity growth plus the growth in the labor 
force or the working age population or some similar measure. And leaving aside a number of 
minor issues such as average hours and statistical discrepancies--which are not unimportant--we 
find that the measure of the difference between the change in GDP and the sum of labor force 
growth plus structural productivity growth is effectively some measure of changing 
unemployment. And declining unemployment is very likely the consequence of the wealth effect, 
which is boosting consumption over and above what is normally expected of PCE out of income. 
Whether in current circumstances it will be possible to offset the increase in demand on the cost 
side, I think, is the wrong question to ask. That’s because it is by no means evident that the current 
expansion is going to slow at all. The reason is that if productivity is continuing to accelerate and 
we put that into our econometric model, we are not going to get a slowdown in economic activity. 
We are going to get motor vehicle sales possibly of 20 million at an annual rate instead of, say, 17 
million. We are going to get housing starts of, say, 2 million and not 1.5 million because gross 
domestic income and gross domestic product--leaving out the discrepancy, as I have indicated 
previously—have to balance. . . The reason I raise this question is that we are seeing a remarkable 
acceleration in economic activity now, which under our old regime where the supply side is 
relatively stable would lead us to say that this expansion is getting dramatically out of hand.  
So, I would say that the issue is not whether productivity can grow fast enough to keep pace with 
demand growth. We are dealing with a simultaneously structured economy in which the very 
forces that are driving productivity—primarily technology—are boosting the income side and the 
capital assets side, both of which are having an impact on the demand side. I think it is essential 
for us to recognize that we have this kind of interaction. If we don’t, we very well could be 
looking at a benign expansion on the demand side that is being fostered wholly by increased 
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I am not saying that the evidence is completely consistent with the argument I have just made. 
Even with that argument, we still have a significant wealth effect, so that actual demand growth is 
in excess of potential supply; but both are rising very rapidly. All I can say is that at this particular 
stage the number of workers who are seeking jobs is decreasing. As that number shrinks, real 
compensation per hour obviously will move well ahead of productivity at some point, in which 
case inflation will take place. So, even under my assumption that the second derivative is positive, 
all that does is to prevent unit labor costs from rising for a while. But at some point, that process 
engenders greater growth in real compensation per hour than in productivity, which itself is 
accelerating, and at the end of the day we end up with acceleration in prices. The difference 
between the two scenarios is that the time frames are dramatically different. In one case we are 
looking at acceleration in inflation almost immediately as we get into the year 2000, while the 
other scenario delays the whole process--perhaps quite significantly. Moreover, it may very well 
be, as I think a number of us are expecting, that the wealth effect will finally simmer down 
because of the existence of a bubble that can’t persist and that the two effects will converge and 
there will be no inflationary imbalances. 
I submit that we have a very complex set of problems to deal with, and we have to exercise a bit of 
humility in looking at the models we are employing to reflect reality, as a number of you have 
said. Because we have used a zero second derivative for productivity in every forecast, we have 
underestimated real economic growth and overestimated inflation. A lot of you have mentioned 
that. I submit that we are doing it again. That does not mean it’s the wrong thing to do, but I do 
wish to suggest that there is an alternative assumption. The difference is whether you consider the 
first derivative to be positive and constant or you wish to add a second derivative that is also 
positive. I am saying that the most recent trend would argue in favor of the second alternative, 
which is just an extrapolation of what has been occurring. The question is whether that assumption 
is valid. 
 
Little discussion followed the Chairman’s extended lecture. In effect, though, Greenspan was arguing that 
rapid productivity growth, via wealth effects, would fuel a boom in housing not seen since the 1970s, and 
an historic rise in auto sales. From the vantage point of 2011, Greenspan’s forecast for housing starts to 
reach 2 million units and auto sales to reach 20 million units appear rather prescient. Although sales of 
passenger cars and light trucks peaked at about 18 million units in the first quarter of 2005, housing starts 
eventually surpassed 2 million units in late 2003 and would hit a peak of nearly 2.3 million units in 
January 2006. 
For the November 1999 meeting, the staff increased its predicted growth of structural (trend) labor 
productivity by several tenths, in part due to revisions to the national income accounts data.27  Committee 
members almost uniformly saw robust productivity gains in their districts, and adopted the Chairman’s 
viewpoint. Yet, several members expressed concerns regarding how long the Chairman’s second 
                                                      
27 For discussions of productivity revisions and the national income account revisions, see Anderson and Kliesen 
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derivative of productivity could remain positive before returning to its “traditional” value of zero. In his 
soliloquy, Chairman Greenspan acknowledged that accelerating productivity creates an “unbalanced” 
expansion that cannot continue—demand increases due to the induced wealth effect threaten the 
productivity acceleration itself. Again, the Chairman utilizes a long lecture to persuade the Committee to 
accept his economic model and “follow his lead.” In this discussion, however, the focus begins to turn  
away the beneficial effects of more rapid productivity growth and toward the corrosive effects of overly 
rapid, productivity-fueled demand growth  [We have edited for length]: 
On the productivity side, the data if anything continue to be strongly supportive of increasing rates 
of productivity gains. . . [T]he escalation of productivity is far more pronounced, in terms of its 
second derivative so to speak, if we use both the income side measure of output and the household 
survey measure of hours to make the calculations over the past several years—indeed, going back 
into the 1980s. . . And the question is how that should be interpreted. 
One thing that is important to interpret is whether accelerating productivity engenders a stable 
economic system. The answer is, in fact, that it does not, and it’s in this regard that accelerating 
productivity exerts upward pressure on real long-term rates. The reason is that if we get 
accelerating income-side or supply-side growth and the propensity to consume out of the income 
engendered from that is unchanged, then arithmetically we end up with demand equal to supply. 
The unemployment rate does not change. The associated inflation pressures are nonexistent. But 
there is a problem in the fact that if productivity is accelerating and if it is presumed that the 
underlying cause of that acceleration will change the long-term outlook for corporate earnings at 
any existing fixed discount rate, the expectation of higher earnings will engender an increase in 
stock market wealth. And of necessity if there is a wealth effect—and there is some dispute about 
that between New York Bank and Board staff--we invariably will get a decline in the propensity to 
save out of income. So, we end up with the need to satisfy aggregate demand in excess of 
domestic supply. 
The bottom line is that we really do not know how this system works. It’s clearly new. The old 
models just are not working. And the reasons they are not working are essentially that we have a 
rapidly changing structure whose parameters are very difficult to estimate, and, therefore, we have 
to depend in part on anecdotal information and in part on some sort of risk evaluation.  
 
The final meeting of 1999, on December 21, contained little analysis not in prior meetings. The wealth 
effect was prominent in the Chairman’s remarks as he argued that it cannot—and hence will not—
continue indefinitely. But few price pressures were noted, and the Committee agreed that a policy action 
would be unwise on the eve of the millennium.  
A NEW MILLENNIUM, A NEW ENEMY 
Table 1 shows a progression of the staff’s projections of structural labor productivity growth at 
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of structural productivity by the Board staff remained around 1.5 percent. As seen in Figure 2, this was 
consistent with private-sector forecasters. But as we have documented, Chairman Greenspan vigorously 
disputed these estimates for quite some time. Over time, though, data revisions began to confirm the 
Chairman’s hypothesis that, first, the data was flawed, and second, the staff’s model was giving an 
inaccurate portrait of underlying productivity growth. This began to change dramatically in 1999 and by 
the time of the first meeting of 2000, February 1-2, the staff was now estimating structural productivity 
growth to be 3 percent—nearly double the pace of the 1980s and early 1990s. Projected potential output 
growth increased to a 4 percent rate over 2000 and 2001, as multifactor productivity increased to near a 1 
percent annual rate.  A number of members expressed doubts. President Minehan noted that the revised 
productivity growth is more rapid than almost all other forecasters. Governor Meyer, who by now had 
become a full-fledged convert to Greenspan’s hypothesis, defended the staff’s forecast by noting that they 
more accurately captured the effects of productivity revisions on supply and demand better than most 
private-sector forecasts. This assertion was based on Chairman Greenspan’s “virtuous circle” wherein 
demand is boosted by wealth effects flowing from the productivity acceleration.  
Inflation concerns were widespread. President Moskow cited reservations from his academic 
advisory council; others cited concerns regarding labor market pressures. Governor Gramlich noted that 
unit labor costs are near constant, and that the Blue Chip survey forecasts no increase.  Governor Meyer, 
who a few years earlier chided the Chairman as a poster child for the New Economy, again draws on the 
implications of the virtuous circle for further undesired increases in aggregate demand:  
My first observation is that the risks have now become significantly tilted toward higher inflation. 
That judgment is based on the still more robust growth at the already very high labor utilization 
rate, by the dissipation or reversal of the favorable relative price shocks that have been restraining 
inflation, and by some signs of incipient pressure on nominal compensation and inflation. . . While 
there have been consistent upward revisions to trend growth and a growing appreciation of the 
importance of higher productivity growth in explaining recent macroeconomic experience, the key 
challenge for monetary policy today derives from the persistent imbalance between the growth in 
supply and demand.  
In his remarks, Chairman Greenspan displays a shift toward the cautions expressed by Governor 
Meyer:  The wealth effect resulting from productivity acceleration, eventually, will cause an unacceptable 
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productivity. But, ultimately, if we do not solve the problem of the gap, meaning that if the acceleration in 
productivity leads to continued expectations of accelerating earnings per share, the only way to eliminate 
the wealth effect, which has to be eliminated, is for the market rate used by investors to calculate the 
present value of expected earnings to rise.”  Yet, he councils caution because “too aggressive” an increase 
in the federal funds policy target could “crack the [stock] market” and lead to financial instability. He 
proposes a 25 basis point increase—despite there being no evidence of increasing inflation. It is 
impossible to know to what extent this action was intended to build consensus on the Committee. 
At the March meeting, the staff again increased its estimate of trend productivity by 0.2 percentage 
points to 3.2 percent, albeit still somewhat less than 2000’s published 3-3/4 percent increase (see Table 
1).  Most members comment that little has changed since the previous meeting. Governor Meyer concurs, 
raising in his comments the “inflation alarm” louder and clearer than other members, but argues that the 
Committee should engage in a preemptive tightening action: 
While core inflation remains well contained, I agree with the Greenbook forecast that it will soon 
begin to rise, reflecting the secondary effects of the recent rise in oil prices, the dissipation or 
possible reversal of various favorable price shocks that restrained inflation earlier, and the effects 
of very tight labor markets. Monetary policy tightening today would clearly be preemptive and 
appropriately so. . . Slowing the economy to trend is unlikely to contain the risk of higher 
inflation. . .  We should therefore be especially determined to slow the economy at least to trend 
quickly and to be aggressively reactive to increases in core inflation. 
 
Director Kohn concurs, while noting that recent further acceleration of productivity will temper 
inflationary pressures for the near-term. Kohn emphasizes that, if accelerating productivity is increasing 
the economy’s neutral, or “natural,” rate of interest, than further increases in the Committee’s nominal 
interest rate target are necessary to forestall further upward pressure on inflation from increased 
productivity.  The “virtuous circle” is reversed!  The sheen clearly has faded on the productivity 
acceleration miracle among the Committee members.  In his remarks, Chairman Greenspan reiterates the 
same points. 
Discussion at the May 2000 meeting is similar, with Director Prell noting that the Committee likely 
has not yet increased rates enough to close the gap between demand and supply growth.  Startling is Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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Chairman Greenspan’s de facto labeling of further productivity acceleration as “Public Enemy Number 1” 
in the fight for price stability.  Productivity accelerations—something that most economists would believe 
to be overwhelmingly beneficial to the economy—are labeled as weed to be eradicated via rapid interest 
rate increases.  Wisdom?  Dismissing the staff’s productivity projections, the Chairman recommends a 50 
basis point increase in the funds rate target. In part, the Chairman’s rationale rests on the arguments made 
by President Broaddus a year earlier (higher real interest rates are necessary response to a favorable 
productivity shock):  
The reason I am not concerned about moving the rate up quickly at this stage is that I think the 
evidence indicates that productivity, indeed perhaps underlying GDP, is still accelerating. I 
recognize that the staff’s estimate of productivity growth for the first quarter, based on the latest 
published figures and adjusted for the defense spending anomaly, is 1-½ percent. I don’t believe 
that estimate for a fraction of a second. I don't think it has even a remote possibility of being 
accurate because of the evidence we are getting on profit margins, which clearly are still opening 
up at this point. Indeed, using the available data on income and profits, which essentially reflect 
the unit cost structure of nonfinancial corporations, the productivity growth number that falls out 
of that system according to staff estimates is a 6 percent annual rate. That number is consistent 
with our unit cost analyses and our estimates for prices, profits, and wages, granted that the 
estimate for wages may be a little to the weak side. . . What is remarkable at this stage is not that 
inflationary forces are picking up. It is that there is so little evidence of a pickup. I think, for 
example, that the acceleration in wages is unambiguous. . . I think we are in a quite different 
environment than we have seen in the past. In such environment real long-term interest rates have 
to rise. 
I think what we have is still the beginning, or perhaps we are well into it at this stage, of a 
significant long-term change in the behavior of the economy. This is not to say that we don't have 
a cyclical element involved in these growth numbers nor does it mean that higher interest rates, 
especially real long-term rates, are having no effect. Indeed, the evidence is now beginning to 
show that the alleged absence of any effect from what we have done to date, or more importantly 
what the markets have done to date, is a false notion. . . There is as yet no compelling evidence 
that inflationary pressures are easing, I believe it would be a mistake not to stay asymmetric and 
our press release should reflect such a decision.  
 
Director Stockton notes that inflation remains tame. Although energy prices had boosted personal 
consumption expenditures (PCE), growth of core PCE [omitting food and energy] was projected to fall 
back to a 2 percent rate in 2001.  Nevertheless, he recommends an highly aggressive 75 basis point 
increase in the federal funds policy target to forestall possible inflation. As seen in Figure 6, the intended 
federal funds target was now at 6.5 percent, where it would remain until January 2001. 
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The momentum toward tightening—to fight an inflation not yet in evidence—continues at the June 
meeting.  In many respects, the FOMC by this meeting has adopted inflation-forecast targeting—but how 
accurate are the forecasts?  Governor Gramlich, in comments that in two years time will seem near 
clairvoyant, cautions against moving policy too quickly and too far on the basis of highly uncertain 
forecasts: 
Until now the real economy has been rocketing ahead at a seemingly unsustainable rate and there 
was at least a whiff in the air that underlying inflation was picking up. Now real growth has 
slowed, quite quickly in fact, and the signs of acceleration in inflation do not look so strong either. 
. . It is at least possible that the Fed has already done enough tightening and that we can stand back 
and examine our work. There are grounds for thinking that we have done enough already. If the 
long-run core inflation rate is about 2 percent and the long-run real interest rate is around 4 
percent—which can be read from either the TIP market or inflation-corrected nominal interest 
rates—the nominal federal funds rate should be at least 6 percent for a balanced economy. Throw 
in 50 basis points for leaning against the wind or adjusting for the balance of risks and we are at 
the present funds rate.  
Let me make one further comment on the hard landing scenario. While the risk of recession was 
the last thing on everybody’s mind last month when the economy was rocketing ahead, the sharp 
drop in real growth at least raises this issue. Given the strength of the present investment boom, I 
am inclined to downplay any risk of recession. But the Committee should be mindful of the risk of 
overshooting. Policy should be preemptive on the down side as well as the up side. Putting all this 
together, it is possible that the Fed has already done enough, that the funds rate is already high 
enough to stabilize the economy. But I emphasize the word possible because there is still 
significant risk that the NAIRU could be in excess of 5 percent and then inflation could begin to 
heat up or, in Bill Poole’s terms, that the Fed won’t be perceived as being tough enough on 
inflation. For now at least, I’m fairly comfortable reverting to our previous watchful waiting 
mode, giving strong signals that we still think the balance of risks is on the up side and that we are 
prepared to take appropriate action if the data become disquieting.  
The Chairman’s remarks, somewhat briefer than often is the case, reiterate his position from the prior 
meeting, that further productivity acceleration represents a clear and present danger to price stability.  
Nothing is gained by repeating them here. 
At the August 2000 meeting, with the economy at the tail end of the extraordinarily long 1991-2000 
expansion, the staff once again increased its projection of structural productivity growth. This was largely 
because of newly-revised incoming data. Board research director David Stockton noted a sea-change in 
the staff view, however. Previously, productivity accelerations were seen as inducing demand increases in 
excess of supply gains. Now, further consumer spending gains were viewed as unlikely, although 
business investment remained robust.  This turning point in the staff projections is important: Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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In contrast to the signs of slowing in household spending, business outlays for capital equipment 
have continued to surge ahead. One of the most notable aspects of the recent annual revision to the 
national accounts was that the investment boom of recent years is now estimated to have been 
even stronger than previously thought. Moreover, there are few signs, if any, that higher real long-
term interest rates have put an appreciable dent in the demand for equipment and software. It just 
doesn’t look like this boom is about to dissipate any time soon. . . 
Taken together, these observations motivated our upward revisions to the growth of structural 
productivity and potential output. Indeed, given both the mounting contribution from capital 
deepening implied by our investment forecast and some further improvement in the growth of 
multifactor productivity, we are projecting a modest ongoing acceleration of structural 
productivity--3-1/2 percent this year and 3-3/4 percent in 2001, up about 1/2 percentage point 
from our last forecast. The revision to structural productivity not only affects potential GDP, it 
also has important implications for the demand side of our forecast. In particular, it boosts the 
growth of real incomes and spending and is the chief reason that we have adjusted up our real 
GDP growth forecast by a half percentage point in 2001 to 4 percent. This outcome might seem 
somewhat surprising in light of many of the simulations we have shown you in recent years. In 
those simulations, faster trend productivity growth typically caused growth in demand to outstrip 
that of the productivity-enhanced growth of supply, at least for a time. As you will recall, an 
important channel for that effect came through the influence of faster productivity growth on asset 
values and, consequently, on consumption and investment. But our interpretation of recent events 
is that while we hapless economists have been only slowly marking up our forecasts for 
productivity growth, the markets and private-sector agents had already been anticipating this 
improvement. Thus, we are not looking for any additional increment to spending from a further 
productivity-driven rise in the stock market. 
The slowing expenditures of late 2000 become a rout during 2001—the previously undesired further 
strength in aggregate demand would be as welcome as the prodigal son. Did inflation forecast targeting 
fail the FOMC? Did the FOMC fail inflation forecast targeting? Or did an economic shock bedevil the 
forecasts? 
The year 2001 begins with a January 3
rd FOMC conference call, a reaction to perceived weak 
incoming economic data regarding employment, corporate earnings, retail sales (including motor 
vehicles), consumer confidence, and housing markets. In discussion, it becomes apparent that members 
have not changed their hawkish views regarding trend, or “structural,” productivity growth, and regard 
recent weakness in productivity growth as cyclical. Chairman Greenspan notes: “I think it is important to 
indicate in our press statement that there is little evidence to date of any deterioration in the long-term 
advances in technology and the related expansion in productivity.” His desire is quickly supported by 
other Committee members.   
Optimism regarding productivity growth continued at the January 30-31 meeting.  Key  was the 
staff’s view that multifactor productivity was “still growing rapidly.” Moreover, the staff held the view Forthcoming, Business Economics     Version of 21 November 2012 
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that strong growth of structural productivity was being “reflected in a strong expansion of permanent 
income, and, after the economy passes through the current inventory correction, in actual income as 
well.” The staff’s “subdued” inflation forecast was also attributed to the faster growth of structural 
productivity. Chairman Greenspan remained convinced not only that the economy was in the midst of a 
massive structural change, but that monetary policymakers would have to face the prospect of altering 
their response to economic developments:  
To me the evidence strongly suggests that we are in an advanced high-tech and just-in-time 
inventory type of economic system, including the capital goods markets where adjustments 
happen far faster because information is so much more readily available. If that is the case, since 
we are dealing with mood swings that are rooted in an unchanging human nature, then I think it 
follows that monetary policy must also compress itself into a narrower timeframe. That means we 
have to move faster, sooner, quicker, and complete the operation in a shorter period of time.” 
Meetings during the balance of the year raised few new issues. Eventually, the recession of 2001 gave 
way to the so-called jobless recovery of 2002-2003. At the January 29-30, 2002, with the intended federal 
funds target rate 1.75 percent, the meeting opened with a discussion of the zero-bound problem for 
monetary policy.28  The FOMC would eventually lower its target rate to 1 percent at the June 2003 
meeting and hold at the level for a year. In part, the Committee’s decision reflected an unwelcome fall in 
inflation. But because that episode of super-easy monetary policy, arguably, had a profound influence on 
the macroeconomy and monetary policy discussions for many years to come. However, that story is best 
left to another paper. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
  Productivity’s acceleration has played a major role in monetary policymaking during the last 
decade, and a significant part of the policy debate concerned the quality of incoming data.  Accurate, 
timely data are essential for activist monetary policymaking.  The FOMC transcripts from 1996 and 1997 
                                                      
28 The zero bound problem arises when a central bank, working with an overnight interest rate as its single policy 
instrument, finds that the desired setting for that rate is below zero. Nominal interest rates cannot be less than zero 
(absent a subsidy or partial forgiveness of a debt). If the policy rate is at the zero bound and inflation is falling, then 
the real policy rate will be increasing; if, in turn, this further attenuates economic activity such that inflation falls 
further (or becomes negative), a cumulative process might be launched that drives the economy into an extended 
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suggest that Chairman Greenspan placed little confidence in aggregate real GDP as an indicator of the 
direction of the economy.  Rather, his focus was on a broad array of individual-industry data.  In 
particular, he focused on productivity growth in manufacturing and the broader nonfinancial corporate 
sector.  One danger in such a disaggregate approach is that many industries primarily produce 
intermediate products that do not appear directly in GDP.29  Policymakers risk significant errors if they 
respond too rapidly to incoming data that later revise significantly.30  
The FOMC’s experience with productivity growth teaches several lessons. First, anecdotal evidence 
can be extremely valuable in forming perceptions of underlying data not readily apparent in the published 
data—an observation comfortable to business economists but frightening to some academics lacking 
business experience. Second, disaggregate data can also be informative, sometimes before changes are 
apparent in aggregate published data, despite the typical emphasis of policy being only aggregate 
variables such as real GDP. Third, if policymakers have valid reasons for questioning the reliability of the 
published data, then model-based forecasts should be used cautiously. These aspects of policymaking, 
which undergird much of its uncertainty, implies that monetary policy is an exercise in risk management. 
Alan Greenspan was a firm advocated of this approach. However, success in risk management often 
requires some gambling instincts—and like most gambling, losses might be incurred. During the 1990s, 
the FOMC’s gambling paid handsome rewards. Policymaking by Committee is difficult, and the skill of a 
chairman to bring consensus cannot be overvalued.  Finally, inflation forecast targeting is not easily 
implemented. At times during the 1990s and early 2000s, inflation forecast targeting with misspecified 
models appeared to lead the FOMC astray. 
  
                                                      
29 This point is made clearly by Triplett (2002). 
30 In the models of Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2004), optimal response to imperfect observation of output (and 
productivity) depends on the noise in the system.  The optimal response to the optimal estimate of output displays 
certainty equivalence—but what is to be done when different policymakers have different estimates of potential 
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Figure 3:  Estimates of R*, 1990-2004 
 
SOURCE:  FOMC Bluebook, June 29-30, 2004 
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